Getting Credit for What You Write? Conventions and Techniques of Citation in German Anthropology

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Abstract. Contemporary citing practices do something significant to developments in the sciences and the humanities: they create giants by attributing a scarce academic good – namely originality – to certain authors, while ignoring others. Originality is not a straightforward qualification of a contribution and its impact on academic disputes. Rather it is something that is made and stabilized through citation practices. We contend that the criteria by which authors select from an ocean of possible sources relate to structuring principles that organize the scientific field and various understandings of “what is” a proper publication and “what counts” in publishing scholarly work. The assertion is that these understandings can be identified as conventions of citation, which inform writing and citing practices. Thus far, this seems to be nothing particularly new. However, we bring existing arguments and approaches together to (1) make a first step towards a novel approach to citation analysis and (2) explore several conventions and techniques of citation in German-speaking anthropology after 1965. We show that some citing techniques have solidified more than others and contribute to aporetic debates about German anthropology’s parochialism.

[Citations, Originality, Conventions, Science and Technology Studies]

Introduction

The usual account for referring to one or another author is the recognized originality of her contribution. While this in itself is always a problematic claim, it has become all the more so in view of the massive growth of available literature. In recent decades, the time and effort to make out significant work has multiplied. Hence, we ask how scholars go about this task. How is the value of a publication assessed? Why do we cite one author or school and not another? By what cues do we notice her work and not another’s? And why, perhaps especially in German anthropology, do we sometimes tend to ignore what is nearby while eagerly gulping down the distant? We ask the classical

1 We are grateful to Ursula Rao for commenting on a first draft of this paper, and to Michael Guggenheim for comments on a later version. Special thank is due to Joerg Potthast who helped us to sharpen our argument.
anthropological question: what the heck is going on here? And we let this riddle guide our explorations of the field that we shall call conventions and techniques of citation.

This paper strives to make a first step towards a larger argument and thus remains somewhat explorative in a Shandean manner. Beware: We exaggerate to draw out the contours of citation practices in German-speaking anthropology after 1965 and to make a point for a novel approach to the analysis of citation practices in general. Our aim is neither to provide a balanced nor a complete picture. The contention is that a number of conventions of citations can be identified that are ready at hand. That is, they were invested in over a longer period of time and can function as shorthand that anthropologists adopt for not having to justify methods, grounds and premises of where to look and whom to cite. At the same time, scholars obviously still strive to achieve certain outcomes with their publications and hence reflect on and defend their bibliographical selection.

Concerning the object we constructed for our investigation, we seek to add to debates about the specificities of German-speaking anthropology, in particular its conventions and techniques of citations and, at least marginally, its lack of one or several clear profiles (Haller 2012:15). Internationally, German-speaking anthropology attracts comparatively little attention at least since World War II, and according to some observers has fallen “into complete oblivion” (Hauschild 1997:747). Even if this is a grossly exaggerated and dramatized perception, bibliometrics seems to prove it. Citation indexes, such as the Hirsch-Index or the Social Science Citation Index, increasingly are used in various contexts as the only means to assess the quality of publications and thus of authors. By this measure, many German anthropologists have little of value to say, at least beyond the German language barrier. Given that German-speaking social sciences and the humanities were long known for their strength in theory building (Galtung 1981), it seems remarkable that post-war anthropology is charged with avoiding overarching theoretical frameworks and having an empiricist orientation (Haller 2012:88). While other disciplines have brought forth such notable scholars – to name just a few – as Jürgen Habermas, Niklas Luhmann, Ralf Dahrendorf, Norbert Elias, Thomas Berger, Peter Luckmann, Axel Honneth, Karin Knorr Cetina, and Ulrich Beck, whose theoretical propositions are debated internationally, a comparable contribution of German-speaking anthropology is missing. Why have disciplines such as philosophy and sociology managed to maintain the German-speaking tradition with such nonchalance? And what creates a sense of marginalization among German anthropologists, which often leads to either a feeling of inferiority or of unrecognized superiority?

To contribute to theoretical debates in science studies and anthropology, we introduce the sociology/anthropology of conventions to citation studies. Reflecting on various citation practices in our scholarly environment, we hold that mostly authors do not deliberately try to delude readers or colleagues about the source of their knowledge; at least those are not the cases we are interested in. When asked, many scholars explain their referencing by the originality and importance of the quoted works; at the same time, most would not object to a messier explanation of their bibliographic selection.
We draw attention to a number of largely unnoticed or silenced dimensions that are part of our attempt of painting a messier picture. In this perspective, citation practices are an intriguing field of study. Knowledge and scientific trends and turns are influenced by these practices that are not immediately related to the analytics and contents of research and are therefore normally deemed unworthy of mention or are black-boxed. We thus are after the mundane citing practices, which seem “to come naturally” while writing about a given topic and yet result from the enactment of certain conventions. Our assumption is that it is not simply the outstanding quality of scholarship that explains why a piece of writing is cited, but that other mechanisms are also at work here. Asserting this, we do not imply that authors with texts that lack substance and originality can succeed in the long run. We rather suggest that this simply is not the whole story.

Making Giants Through Citations

Citations are banal at first sight and who needs to be cited often seems crystal clear. Who would write of “multi-sited ethnography” without quoting Marcus 1995, of “scapes” without reference to Appadurai 1996 or of “purification” without putting Latour 1993 in brackets? Confirming or challenging the originality of such contributions is not our goal. Since in this paper we are concerned with the specificities of citation practices in German-speaking anthropology after 1965, we ask: why are there no contributions similar to “Appadurai 1996” from German-language anthropology? One might say that there simply are no internationally reputed original contributions to anthropological theorization – or even ethnographies – that are decidedly German and which could be cited (Oberdiek 2013). Yet, the causal argument works the other way also: since German anthropologists are undercited, they plainly cannot rise to international repute and hence cannot turn into the metaphorical giants that Robert K. Merton wrote about (1991 [1965]). The motor of disciplinary innovation appears to

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2 We are referring to Latour (1993a) in the reference list.
3 In On the Shoulders of Giants, Merton (1991 [1965]) examined an aphorism concerning the progression and cumulation of knowledge. It likens contemporaries to dwarfs who stand (or sit) on the shoulders of giants, that is, the ancients. While monstrous, giants are also essential for the development of knowledge: They enable dwarfs, who mount them, to see further than they themselves can see. Merton contended that the coinage of this aphorism is wrongly attributed to a giant of learning of the seventeenth century, namely Isaac Newton, disguising its origins, which he traces back to early twelfth century, with Bernard of Chartres (Merton 1991 [1965]:12, 178). Actually, this is also a joke and a challenge to others to prove him wrong, since Merton was acutely aware of the impossibility of establishing origins once and for all. With great minuteness and spoofing of scholarly practices, Merton elaborated many details with various lengthy detours and digressions of how this aphorism has been interpreted and used by various intellectuals in the past centuries. For example, he quoted seventeenth century scholar Goodman, who interrogated the assumption that dwarfs are raised up, by asking how they manage to climb upon the high shoulders in the first place and then how they manage to stay there (Merton 1991 [1965]:44–46).
be firmly rooted in Anglo-Saxon anthropology. Thus, being undercited is not per se a German problem, but applies more generally to much scholarship outside the narrow confines of English-speaking anthropology. We however argue that German-speaking anthropology tends to amplify this trend, which supports the growth of other giants: authors are especially fond of contributions from elsewhere. This allophilia may explain why, even if a debatable contribution is made in German-speaking anthropology, it hardly is cited and does not travel.

German dwarfs therefore stand on the shoulders of international giants. Mounting a giant presupposes the existence of a giant, but clearly – at least in the scholarly context – nobody is born as a giant and only few ancients have entered our memory. The probing question for us thus is how giants emerge and are made? Sticking to this picture: how do the many dwarfs manage to turn one of them into a giant? When we invert the image and no longer take the existence of giants for granted – whether in the limited sense as the ancients or in the broader sense, which we prefer, as all famous scholars – then the focus shifts to the practices that can bring those gargantuan beings to life and foster their growth. Our assertion is that citing is the key practice in the raising of giants. To make this point we examine actual practices of German-speaking anthropologists, namely how they go about selecting whom they cite and call upon in support of their argument and pay attention to their global situatedness. Our contention is that citations are neither coincidental nor do they self-evidently arise from the contents, but rather are practices informed by techniques and conventions, which have emerged in the humanities throughout the past five decades.

Perspectives on the Organisation of the Sciences and Citations

The field of the sciences and humanities is shot through with various political and economic inequalities and power asymmetries, pertaining to North-South and gender relations, race, class, nationality, or even language, with more or less clear power centres (Dominguez, Gutmann and Lutz 2013). Such developments can also be linked to an increasing standardization of academic curricula, which only reinforces the tendency to read and quote dominant authors. They are also linked to the political economy of publishing houses, their marketing strategies, the size of their markets and to the composition of their editorial boards, as well as to the gate-keeping practices of peer-reviewed journals. In an article on postcolonial techno-science, Abraham (2006:214) discusses the difficulties two Indian scientists encountered in publishing important research. Their paper drew on a fellow Indian’s pioneering work in physics. It was rejected by an American journal with the charge that the paper contained “nothing new.” The problem was that the contribution of their fellow Indian (“Singh”), published three decades earlier, was unacknowledged. A US-American scholar (“Jones”) had recently reached a similar but less sophisticated solution than Singh, but this was enough to credit him with all the originality; the two Indian scholars
who sought to remind of this valuable contribution and to take it further were thought to be mere epigones. After a lengthy struggle with reviewers and editors, the paper was finally published and then was also widely cited by other authors. Nonetheless, the case underlines “the provincialism prevailing among western scientific gatekeepers, their sense of the limits of the “normal” scientific community, and their fixed expectations of those who lie beyond it” (Abraham 2006:14).

Tracing the principles that structure the scientific field, Latour (1993b) depicts a young French biologist named Pierre Kernowicz, who is working hard on his career and seeks recognition:

Enfin, comme Pierre est chez Pincus [the director of an cognised American laboratory] et publie dans un bon journal, on ne peut se permettre d’utiliser ses travaux sans le citer, ainsi que ses lecteurs auraient pu le faire si l’auteur avait été un Français de France ou un Japonais du Japon. Pour toutes ces raisons, Pierre se retrouve avec un capital de crédibilité nettement supérieur à celui qu’on lui avait prêté en entrant. L’ensemble formé par Pierre et ses idées est «valable» et rapporte à celui qui investit sur lui. (Latour 1993b:108)

Pierre Kernowicz chooses his topic strategically, moves to the USA and then successfully uses the fame of the senior scientist who had employed him to place his articles in top journals. The ensemble composed of him and his published ideas now has acquired worth—others can no longer afford using “his” ideas without citing him; further investments into this ensemble promise a good return rate. Kernowicz achieved what he wanted to achieve: he gets credit for what he writes. One of the necessary conditions for this was his move to the USA so that he cannot be ignored like “un Français de France ou un Japonais du Japon.”

Citations indicate how recognition and merits are distributed in the academic field; a plethora of studies have dealt with this. Still, “analyses of citations in scientific papers tend to tell us little about the substance of the papers” (Latour and Woolgar 1986 [1979]:18). Latour and Woolgar (1986 [1979]:83) thus propose examining citation practices with a view to contents, that is, how they participate in the fabrication of facts. In Science in Action (2003 [1987]), Latour traces how authors surround their propositions with citations, drawing support by enrolling many “friends” and discrediting and isolating “foes”, to persuade readers to believe in the truth of what is expounded before them.4 Thereby, the value of a publication is only assessed in hindsight, a later generation of articles which confirm, challenge or ignore it decide on whether the information presented can stabilize as a fact or remains fiction. The main

4 Latour specifies: “A paper that does not have references is like a child without an escort walking at night in a big city it does not know: isolated, lost, anything may happen to it. On the contrary, attacking a paper heavy with footnotes means that the dissenter has to weaken each of the other papers, or will at least be threatened with having to do so” (Latour 2003 [1987]:33).
point is that the claim made by an article needs to be confirmed by many other articles in order to become a known fact. You cite books and articles to build a net of references to strengthen your idea, but then the decisive point is that you need to be cited many times by others to have this net, confirming the position of your idea within it. Without this confirmation through referencing your contribution remains your own fantasy. Latour writes:

You may protest against the injustice; you may treasure the certitude of being right in your inner heart; but it will never go further than your inner heart; you will never go further in certitude without the help of others. Fact construction is so much a collective process that an isolated person builds only dreams, claims and feelings, not facts. (Latour 2003 [1987]:41)

German anthropologists are, of course, not isolated individuals, yet even collectively they sometimes feel trapped in a field of injustice. Our intention in this paper is neither to support or refute this feeling nor to sketch away out—this we leave to other scholars who will hopefully cite this paper to correct it—but we rather limit our analysis to a more modest exercise: to examine the citations conventions that produce the feeling and at the same time reinforce the mechanisms that prevent “helping fellow dwarfs”.

Latour and Woolgar’s work is a departure from much of conventional citation analysis. This field often is still premised on realist ontologies, although their deficiency has been repeatedly pointed out: citations are seen as representations and direct indicators of quality, impact or influence. To overcome the positivism in such analyses, Woolgar proposes that citations should be studied as institutionalized measurement technologies, which do not measure quality but produce that something they measure (Woolgar 1991:321). In this perspective also, no knowledge claim in a scientific article has any à priori value but rather worth is a post-hoc qualification (Leydesdorff 1998:8).

Similar to Latour (2003 [1987]) and Woolgar (1991), Leydesdorff (1998) sees citations as the means which stabilize communication in the sciences but he differentiates between two types of networks which can be mapped by citation analysts: namely connections authors establish among themselves and, on a second more abstract level, their ideas and the communication among their concepts. Leydesdorff contends that citations at every moment in time reproduce a complex network: they refer to texts which in turn refer to other texts. Or as he states “selections operate on selections” enabling the codification of some references as classics (1998:6). In an article that examines the increased reference to ontology in STS, Van Heur, Leydesdorff and Wyatt (2013:356) advocate combining bibliometrical analyses with qualitative examinations of references. Their method is first measuring the frequency of the word ontology in STS journals and mapping out citation networks by correlating certain variables (i.e. papers, authors, co-words). This is followed by a qualitative analysis which relates citations to contents, that is, specific debates in STS. While we recognize the importance
of bibliometrical analysis ("form") and of the topical contexts of citations ("contents"),
in our view neither method is appropriate for inquiring what authors exactly do when
they select whom to cite. We want to reduce citations neither to a matter of content,
nor to pure coincidence; we also do not believe that citing is all about prior habitual
determinations or matters of interest, strategy, power and economy as other citation
analysts may have it.

Our argument is slightly different. We are inspired by Woolgar's suggestion to re-
think the grounds on which the performance of authors and their texts is compared by
inquiring how worths are constituted in practice. Adopting a praxeological and social
constructivist perspective to explore the specificities of citation practices in German
anthropology means desisting from positing certain culturalist foundations from
which the characteristics of citation in anthropology can be deduced and also abstaining
from examining them only by the content they are meant to support. Instead of
focussing on citation analysts and measurement technologies, we concentrate on actual
practices of German-speaking anthropologists since the mid-1960s, namely how they
go about selecting whom they cite and call upon in support of their argument. Our
goal is to draw out the principles they enrol to justify their own bibliographic selec-
tions and the techniques they use to implement them. Talking of principles here, we
seek to add to the above debates by exploring the various normativities of citation
practices. We contend that the selection of citations is guided by techniques and con-
ventions, which have emerged and stabilized in German anthropology in the past five
decades. Our main point is that citation practices are primarily guided by conventions
that posit "originality" as highest good to achieve fame (not quality, impact, or the
author's status). But what counts as original emerges from negotiations within hetero-
genous orders of worth that are organized by different criteria and values, prioritizing,
for example "inspiration", "domestic ties" (academic parentage), "market profits", "ci-
civic solidarity" and "industrial efficacy".

In the main part of this paper, we explore how fame is collectively produced in
academia and relate the (missing) rise to fame to four conventions of citation. We de-
velop these by borrowing the framework of orders of worth from pragmatic sociology
of critique. The dominance of English reinforces certain conventions and thus works
as a further gatekeeper to be acknowledged. Conventions are not followed blindly but
are enacted intelligently. To put conventions in practice a number of techniques are
needed. The goal is to make one's own work appear in a favourable light by linking
it to select authors and texts, thereby also disassociating it from others. We then exam-
ine present conventions of citation in German anthropology and suggest that four con-
ventions have stabilized historically which draw on different worths and negatively re-
force the invisibility of German-speaking anthropology.
Conventions of Citations: Negotiating Worths

Our understanding of conventions is primarily inspired by the neopragmatist authors Boltanski and Thévenot (2006). They conceive conventions as commonly accepted interpretative and evaluative frameworks. Conventions are established through cumbersome negotiations, or “investments of form” as Thévenot (1984) would have it, and are associated with normativity. People can apply them in situations, for example, when they have to select different authors and sources of inspiration, without having to interrogate their selection practices and their normative implications every time from scratch (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). Conventions are always virtually plural and competing, and they need to be performed in practice to have any purchase on the situation, thereby they are always adjusted and (re)combined in line with the situational exigencies.

In their book De la justification. Les économies de la grandeur (1991), Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot introduce a number of orders of worth which people resort to when generalising in justification or critique. They inductively establish six so-called orders of worth, also called modes of justification when the value of arranged entities is called into question. Their aim is not to provide general criteria of justice or an exhaustive list of theoretical possibilities – in practice all orders form compromises with each other – but to show through which arguments people can justify their own actions in localised situations and how they evaluate the actions of others. Each of these six modes of justification implies specific codes, forms and conventions, that is, principles of coordination, which can establish equivalence among entities. Conventions can stabilize a way of organising relationships in a situation and allow their evaluation in line with the invoked worths, but this is not achieved merely discursively. Rather an ever-increasing arrangement of objects, devices, etc. is put in place which in every situation figures as a test of worths, to wit, of what has been associated by which organizing principles.

Importantly, in De La Justification, Boltanski and Thévenot were mainly concentrating on repertoires of action oriented towards justice. This implies that the six identified modes of justification pertain to dealings in public and have to satisfy demands for a greater generality than other actions (for actions oriented towards other goods, see Boltanski 1990, Thévenot 2006). We feel it is justified to limit ourselves to public actions and to talk of orders of worth, because scholarly publications are about making public statements on matters of concern and – to have an intellectual value – contain or at least pretend to contain an explicit argument.

Boltanski and Thévenot’s (1999:368) ideal-typical definition of the six orders of worth is defined below in reference to three criteria of distinction: (1) mode of evaluation (worth), (2) format of information, and (3) elementary relation.

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5 This proposal transcends other grand attempts to reconcile post-structuralism with the ambition to still identify larger arrangements (such as spheres or systems).
3 Distinguishing criteria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of evaluation (worth)</th>
<th>Format of information</th>
<th>Elementary relation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

6 Orders of worth:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspiration</th>
<th>Grace, nonconformity, creativeness</th>
<th>Emotional</th>
<th>Passion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic order</td>
<td>Esteem, reputation</td>
<td>Oral, exemplary, anecdotal</td>
<td>Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic order</td>
<td>Collective interest</td>
<td>Formal, official</td>
<td>Solidarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fame</td>
<td>Renown</td>
<td>Semiotic</td>
<td>Recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market</td>
<td>Price</td>
<td>Monetary</td>
<td>Exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>Productivity, efficiency</td>
<td>Measurable, criteria, statistics</td>
<td>Functional link</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The six orders of worth are incommensurable. For example, the market order establishes worth through pricing in monetary terms, based on relations between offer and demand. Applying this to citation practices, the worth would be about gaining as many readers and potential citers as possible. This in turn would help to form a school and outsmart competition by branding, and thereby simultaneously would increase a journal’s run. The industrial order measures worth in terms of efficiency and productivity, it is based on standardized scientific and technological instruments. For academic publishing, this would mean citing the certified authorities, whose importance can be measured quantitatively and is indexed by Hirsch Factor or other impact factors. In the domestic order, worth, expressed as reputation, honour and esteem, is based on hierarchical relationships, mostly personal dependencies (i.e. mother-daughter or professor-student). This would imply that authors trust seniority and reputation, duly citing their own superiors. Inspiration, expressed in creativity, imagination and artistic intuition, hinges on attaining grace and it is juxtaposed to fame, which is the most dependent on the recognition of many others, and to the domestic order. This would imply a citation behaviour that is purportedly detached from worldly musings like the desire for fame and recognition, whereby the worth is placed on creativity and sensibilities arising from the author’s inner being. Juxtaposed to the orders of fame and the house, the civic order attaches worth to equality, not to the individual human being. Worth is attached to collective beings (population, associations, unions, etc.) and their actions. Applying this again to citation practices, worth depends on being of general interest and publishing in media that are accessible to a more general public.

These six orders of worth result from practices, which contest and confirm the involved worths (i.e. by drawing boundaries between different worths). Every situation can lead to doubts about the practice and its conformance with the engaged worth, but also more radically, whether this worth is the appropriate ordering principle. However,
this testing cannot escalate in denunciation too often, otherwise it would endanger co-
modation. Thus, the emergence of new modes of justification is not an everyday
vent. Rather inconsistencies between the six ideal-typical modes of justification can
be stabilized through compromises.

Observing and questioning how anthropologists select their sources, we encounter
compromises between various modes of justification. Boltanski and Thévenot give an
example – close to our preoccupation with citations – for how different orders of
worths intersect and then are merged in practice: “Let us call to mind a situation very
familiar in our own milieu, for instance, a controversial discussion about the worth of
a book recently published by a colleague. One can argue that this book is very well
known [fame] or that it sells very well [market]. But one can counteract these praises
by arguing, for example, that such a book is not the result of really systematic work
[industry] or, from another stance, that it is not really creative [inspiration]“
(1999:365). One could add that the book deals with a topic that is of general interest
and addresses a non-expert audience (civic) or that its author is the one trusted author-
ity in this field (house).

Another compromise between different orders of worth in the publication of scho-
larly work is combining open access formats (civic worth), which allow anyone to read
an article, with anonymous peer-reviewing (industrial worth), which ensures that only
few, the most effective articles – those that establish many connections to previous
works, advance new points and argue stringently – are published. While these worths
are incompatible in themselves, they have been stabilized as a publishing format that is
also aligned with the main worths in the academic system, namely the orders of market
and fame: it aims to get the largest market share possible and to be recognized through
citations. This thought experiment can be continued: one would expect citations, as a
particular form of giving evidence, to be situated primarily in the domestic mode of
justification. By citing other authors to strengthen our argument we do in fact name
intellectual mothers and fathers or, in other words, a genealogy of an idea emerges.
Citing thus is the making of genealogies and would therefore be situated in the “do-
metric” order of worth. Yet, citation conventions can only be stabilized when also
drawing from the “market” (referring to the “state of the art” and naming the added
value of the own contribution), the “civic” (respecting copyright and intellectual prop-
erty rights), the “industry” (following standardized methodology when giving evidence
and making generalizations), the “inspiration” (offering something surprisingly novel).
One example for this is calculating the costs needed to produce one paper, the main
research output, and then measure its impact through citations (Latour and Woolgar
1986 [1979]:73). However, citation as the making of genealogies in the domestic order
is rather considered an out-dated pathology. We assert that contemporary citation con-
ventions are primarily situated in the order of worth called “fame”, that this is related
to spreading neoliberal capitalism in academia and also goes along with language pol-
icy.
English as the Universal Scientific Language

English has become the dominant language in the sciences and humanities worldwide and is the main orientation for allophil German-speaking anthropology. Yet, instead of agreeing that monolingualism is troublesome and discriminatory, see how the member of an editorial board of an English-language international journal reacted in 2007 to a fellow member’s (Rottenburg) proposition to consider submissions in other European languages:

The privileging of English is already problematic. I am not in favour of compounding that by privileging some specific European languages on the claimed basis that they are the languages of science – one might claim that the study of philosophy is incomplete without being able to read Greek, or that an understanding of Maths is impoverished without a grasp of Arabic . . . and one could go on and on. The post-colonial history of science reveals the appropriations that Europe has made in the past – and the exclusions it has made to other sciences and other languages; that is not something we should repeat nor something that [this journal] should be a party to. However, if we can find a way to operate which allows for submissions in any language [i.e. Urdu, Arabic, Spanish, Swahili, French, Vietnamese] and have the confidence in a review process in those languages, then it is worth talking about. Let’s think about and pursue this further.

In a first step the editor takes the argument to its absurd end by proposing an obviously infeasible review process, which would have to guarantee an equal treatment of all languages on the globe. In a second step he appeals to the only way to avoid this dead end, namely, sticking to the global lingua franca. He hence prefers the one grand asymmetry – English versus the rest – as the minor evil when compared with the other asymmetry – different languages of scientific communication versus all other languages. One can, of course, easily argue that this is imperialist thinking, yet we want to insist that matters are less trivial when looking at them from the perspective of an anthropology of conventions.

In other debates, one hears that a clear, succinct language, which can reach an audience beyond the narrow academic circles, is crucial to being noticed and digested (Fischer 2003:234). The effective communication of insights and their perception as

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6 Since German-speaking anthropology is hardly cited, do we then have to assume that the German language is too complicated and inaccessible for anthropological interventions? The success of other German-speaking disciplines does not suggest so. However, we do not seek to endorse the other extreme and distance ourselves from Heidegger’s painfully embarrassing statement about French philosophers (made in an interview 1966, published post-mortem in Der Spiegel, 23/1976): “Wenn sie zu denken anfangen, sprechen sie deutsch; sie versichern, sie kämen mit ihrer Sprache nicht durch” (In English we would translate this as: “When the French begin to think, they start speaking German; they affirm that they would not be able to proceed with their own language”).
new contributions to a scientific controversy hinges upon other dimensions also. Obergiek (2013), a good example of an allophil anthropologist, sees the American academy as the sole locus of creativity, a place free from the hierarchical structures, the cloying humility and obsequiousness, which in his view constrain his German co-anthropologists to a mere duplicating of Anglo-American theoretical products and even that with a considerable and disturbing time lag. Other authors interpret the internationalization of academic production quite differently, to wit, as an expression of “undisputed Anglo-American hegemony” (Garcia-Ramon 2003:1; Aalbers 2004). This hegemony is seen as complicating the transmission of knowledges that were won in other traditions and languages. Merton’s own study of the history of the giant aphorism is a case in point. As Umberto Eco points out in his foreword to On the Shoulders of Giants, to someone not trained in the history of English science, he – unlike Merton – immediately ascribed the aphorism to Bernard of Chartres and was not even acquainted with the Anglo-Saxon idea that Newton coined it, an idea that Merton unsettled in more than 200 pages (Eco in Merton 1991 [1965]: xiii).

What then does it mean that English has become the main language through which knowledge is produced and circulated? It means in/excluding and dis/advantaging some. Obviously, native speakers of English are highly privileged. Others have to first acquire a foreign tongue, they have to invest more time for reading, checking words in the dictionary, writing and mastering it. They constantly are in danger of being incomprehensible, embarrassing themselves by using the wrong words, mispronouncing them, and of not being fair-spoken and polite enough. Yet, the problem is not merely linguistic. Rather writing in English exposes authors to another sort of coercion, relating to contents: the dominant Anglo-American discourses and norms often have to be conformed to.

With respect to geography, Aalbers (2004) alleges that the streamlining of writing practices and the generalized need to conform to the standards set by the Anglo-American academy, is policed by the system of peer review and destroys creativity:

Pressure is being applied to non-English writers to publish in English, the top ‘international’ journals (defined by perception and citation indexes), almost exclusively edited, refereed and published by Anglo-American academics and publishers, actively act as gatekeepers, disciplining and policing modes of communication, ideas, interpretation and foci that do not conform to standards set by themselves (Aalbers 2004:321).

Of course, some English language journals have their headquarters in non-Anglophone countries. And English journals generally publish contributions by scholars from many different countries and their reviewers may be located in various countries also. Nonetheless, this does not in itself mean a broad process of internationalisation is under way. In 2001, a study conducted by two geographers asked whether international journals were really international. Based on an analysis of articles in 19 out of 30 geography journals with an international agenda in the Social Science Citation Index, they
conclude that this is not the case (Gutiérrez and López-Nieva 2001). Contributions from US and UK authors alone thus amounted to nearly two thirds of all published pieces, when other Anglophone countries were included in the count, their total share was more than 85 percent of articles. This trend towards US-UK dominance is even surpassed when one looks at the nationality of members of the editorial board, instead of the nationality of authors (Gutiérrez and López-Nieva 2001:60). While we are not aware of a study that makes a comparable point about anthropology, we have no reason to assume that the outcomes would be strikingly different.

Building on Gutiérrez and López-Nieva study, García-Ramon (2003) argues that referring to “international” debates or journals in geography is misleading, because the knowledge produced is dominated by Anglo-American personnel and discourses. Journal referees usually work in the US and UK contexts, and refer authors to debates within this tradition, irrespective of alternative arguments, perspectives and traditions the author might embrace and which may actually move the debate in fresh ways. The relevance of a paper is measured by its ability to situate itself with respect to the latest Anglo-American discourses and pay tribute to the authors that are about to be turned into giants within those discourses. This is not to say that there is some sort of homogeneous and unified Anglo-Saxon debate but rather that new trends, innovations and hypes are set off, like the recent increase of uses of the words ontology and ontological (van Heur, Leydesdorff and Wyatt 2013), defining the vanguard and proximity/distance to the epicentres of progress. The old academic mantra “publish or perish” thus quite often translates into “articulate yourself in English with recourse to the dominant and voguish discourses and authors or have your paper rejected.”

The system of blind peer reviewing is particularly problematic. It not only “reconstitutes the hegemony of the unmarked “master subject” of [anthropology]: bourgeois, white, Anglo-American, heterosexual, able-bodied, and masculine … but it is also blind to the location and specificity of referee(s) [and] author(s)” (Berg 2001:517 c.f. García-Ramon 2003:3; cf. Dominguez, Gutmann and Lutz 2013). While we disagree with the assertion that peer reviewing for Anglo-Saxon journals necessarily reconstitutes all the attributes of the unmarked author enumerated by Berg (bourgeois, heterosexual, able-

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7 They write: “If one looks at the results of the total number of articles published between 1991 and 1997, those countries with the greatest scientific output in the selected journals are, by far, the USA (38.3 % of articles on average) and the UK (35.2 %) (Table 2). Next come Canada (8.6 %) and Australia (3.2 %). Of the remaining countries, only Israel, New Zealand, South Africa and The Netherlands exceed the 1 % limit. Countries with a long geographical tradition, such as France and Germany, contribute only 0.52 % and 0.48 % of articles, respectively – values that are far below the real weight of their current output” (Gutiérrez and López-Nieva 2001:56).

8 Aalbers (2004:320) writes: “Thus, if you happen to work outside of the UK or US but are writing in an English journal, you are often forced to refer to UK or US literature (cf. Berg and Kears 1998). In many cases, this is not the most relevant literature, but in the end you turn up citing the same old native English-speaking authors again, as this is what the referees request.”
bodied, masculine, white), we still maintain that the unmarked position is primarily Anglo-American, although many journals resort to non-Anglo-American reviewers to some extent also. For Garcia-Ramon, this type of gate keeping destroys creativity and diversity. It is also out of sync with the post-foundational understandings that all knowledges are partial and situated (for a US-journal we here would probably have to cite Haraway 1991, but for the ZfE we perhaps should refer the reader to Gadamer 1960 instead). It pretends to be in a neutral position to evaluate contributions but fails to show how it is situated in the dominant Anglo-American academic system.\(^9\)

We are writing this paper in English and (hopefully) in an English style primarily since the whole special issue to celebrate 100 years of institutionalized German anthropology at the University of Leipzig is rendered English for the sake of the international legibility of the event. Within the past 100 years – commemorated by this special volume – one of the most remarkable intellectual changes is the emergence of English as the leading academic language. We therefore not only write in English but also address the dilemmas and ambiguities of doing so. Refusing to write in English would anyway hardly figure as an effective alternative, given that many Anglo-American scholars have limited language skills, that national funding institutions reward writing in English and measure the quality of work through purportedly objective citation indexes, which again prioritize English (Aalbers 2004:321, 322; Garcia-Ramon 2003:4).\(^{10}\) Publishing in German would only further aggravate the problem of the invisibility of German-speaking anthropology in non-German-speaking countries. Yet, an additional crux seems to be that German anthropology is not only hardly noticed abroad, but most of it also tends to be ignored at home. So, why are no giants produced? Who needs giants anyhow? And what kinds of giants are we talking about?

**Techniques of Citation and Academic Branding**

Before we finally concentrate on what we propose to be the main four conventions, we first discuss some of the *techniques* of citation as dearly acquired skills which are em-

\(^9\) A fresh initiative that seeks to dismantle some of the faults of blind peer review by encouraging new forms of collaboration between authors and editors is “Mattering Press”, which publishes work in S&TS. See http://www.matteringpress.org/

\(^{10}\) Such tendencies are reinforced by mechanisms within German academia. The controversial so-called “Exzellenzinitiative” (excellence initiative) run by the German Research Foundation (DFG) is meant to fundamentally change the university landscape. It introduces a different form of competition between universities aimed at turning five to ten into elite universities, while downgrading the rest. Significantly, non-German reviewers were selected to evaluate the excellence of research programmes and thus the working language had to be English. This has similar implications as the reviewing process for Anglo-Saxon journals (which we explore further below) yet with serious financial consequences for universities.
ployed within what we call conventions of citation. Our main attention is on the performative effects of citation practices, which are guided by conventions and put in practice by techniques.

According to Merton the most prevalent technique of citation is *cryptomnesia*, i.e. forgetting an idea’s source and presenting it as one’s own. Following Merton a related and equally widespread technique is the *palimpsestic syndrome*, i.e. covering an earlier idea by ascribing it to a comparatively recent source in whose work the idea was first encountered by the author. Merton calls his most sublime technique, namely “diminishing the scholarly merits of one’s own work by ambitiously contrasting it to the towering work achieved by giants of science and learning”, *parvus-complex* (Merton 1991 [1965]:xxiii). Following the old penchant “if it is fashion, it can’t be true; if it is true, it can’t be fashion” authors employing this technique avoid everything that is trendy or popular and scorn all those mechanisms that produce new giants. Instead they search for those who were left unrecognized, side-lined and forgotten. Like David confronting Goliath, they demonstrate their intellectual superiority by being attentive to detail, to the argument, and not to a flashy appearance or the smoothness of mainstream anthropology. Marginality is thought to protect from the distortions of high fashion and can thus be celebrated as virtue and true abode for academic work.\(^{11}\)

Following Latour (2003 [1987]:34) *perfunctory citation* is a wide-spread technique to mark your allies or sometimes those whom you would love to be your buddies, even though they may not know of you. This technique works as a protective shield: when you attack me, you should be aware that you are automatically also attacking this or that celebrity. Do you really want to go for that? Perfunctory citations include misquotes, quoting something one hasn’t read or something unrelated only for exposition, or habitually citing the same old sources to identify with a certain group of scholars. We guess that particularly fascinating cases of misquote may be references to “multi-sited ethnography” (Marcus 1995) and “multiple modernities” (Eisenstadt 2000). Citation analyst Leydesdorff offers an example by misattributing a claim to Merton: “At the time of the scientific revolution, *Newton* expressed this collective character of the modern scientific enterprise with *his* well-known aphorism: ‘If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants’ (Merton 1991 [1965])” (Leydesdorff 1998:4, our emphasis). Above, we already mentioned Latour’s point about selecting a “context of citation” to strengthen one’s own claims, this could be seen as a further technique of citation.

Another technique is branding. While the renewed focus on branding in the business world since the beginning of neo-liberal era in the 1980s and the simultaneous increase of branding in the academic field are hardly coincidental, developing this as-

\(^{11}\) This love for the margins, may also have motivated Fischer’s (2003) *Randfiguren der Ethnologie* (marginal figures of anthropology), wherein he discusses positive and negative influences of people from the margins on the discipline.
pects lies beyond the scope of this paper.\footnote{Naomi Klein (2000) examined how the attention shifted from manufacturing to marketing and how corporations like Apple, Nike, the Body Shop, Calvin Klein, Starbucks, etc. operate under the assumption that customers do not believe that there is a great difference between products and therefore brands must establish emotional ties with their customers. Lucy Suchman (2000), quoting from Klein refers to a UN Report that found that “the growth in global ad spending outpaced the growth of the world economy by one-third” in 1998 (Suchman 2000:3). While Suchman's argument is about the emergence of anthropology as a market-relevant brand in a world where corporations are after the establishment of emotional ties with culturally heterogeneous consumer groups, we suspect that branding also became part of the academic market.} We contend that branding is something favoured by the structures of the academic field and implies catering to customers' affective preferences by designing unique products, in this case publications (Schimank 2012:11, 12). Drawing an analogy between economic and scientific competition, Schimank maintains (for sociology) that instead of allowing free-market competition, which in his view would enable a clearer ranking of products, the trend toward branding denotes the eschewal of competition through incomparability. By offering an “entirely different” product, authors search out niches in the academic market place and cause its segmentation according to reader’s preference, for trends, classical goods, creative underdogs, established stars and so on (Schimank 2012:13). Schimank posits \textit{bricolage} as a citation technique and the bricoleur as a particular type of competitor on the theory market. That is, branding one's product by offering second-hand combinations of more established brands. This can be a more conservative mixture of two authors but in principle there are no limits on creative combinatorics (Schimank 2012:14). A further type of branding, following Schimank, occurs through reinvention. Self-made branders compete by reinventing the wheel, without recourse to what had been there before them, such as Bruno Latour and Harrison White (Schimank 2012:14). Schimank identifies how certain players attempt a fusion of many or even all brands by means of their own theoretical master plans. They attempt to carve out a \textit{monopoly} and position themselves as spokespersons. His examples are Talcott Parsons, Anthony Giddens and Hartmut Esser (Schimank 2012:14, 15).\footnote{The predominance of “neophilia” as citation convention (see below), which aims to establish a brand, is perhaps related to the neoliberal regulation of the academic market mainly in the US and UK. In this perspective “ANT” would be a brand name similar to “Apple” and similarities in the performance of Bruno Latour and Steve Jobs are indeed striking.}

We assert that the enumerated techniques of citation – the list could certainly be shortened or extended – are employed within certain more or less flexible frameworks, which we call conventions of citation and are part of public modes of justification, which we introduced with reference to Boltanski and Thévenot also as orders of worth.\footnote{What is remarkable about Schimank’s different types and their citation practices they imply, is that there seems to be a vibrant unquestioned theoretical production in German sociology. German-speaking anthropology, in contrast, seems to be lagging behind.}
The techniques sometimes confirm conventions, sometimes they adjust them, leading to an alternating or forging compromises between different conventions.

Identifying Conventions of Citations

Citing is a central practice to certify knowledge as trustworthy and to indicate its source. Given the contemporary structures in the field of knowledge production and the conventions of citation, the going concern of scholars is to have their names attached to an original idea, coining a concept such as “agencement” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Their sweetest dream is to “own” as many concepts as possible, which have to be quoted so frequently that the author is turned into an “obligatory passage point” (here the obligatory reference is Callon 1986) and ideally figures as the founder of a school with its own canon. The highest merit is eponymy like in “Malthusian growth model” or “Pareto efficiency”. Merton’s giant captures this dream. Overall, of course, only few scholars are turned into giants and that obviously also holds true for the US academy. We nonetheless contend that some positions in the international academy are better stages than others (hence Latour’s ironic remark that “un Français de France ou un Japonais du Japon” is well advised to speak at least for some time from a prestigious US research institution to be heard). German anthropologists are remarkably unsuccessful in coining concepts and in being quoted as owners of concepts by others in English-speaking publications.

Their low level of citation, we argue, prevents the transmission, recognition and stabilization of German contributions and hence also the development of giants and schools in German-speaking anthropology. More specifically we argue that in German anthropology there is a comparatively strong tabooing of the domestic order (order of the house, i.e. quoting intellectual parents, children). Our thesis is that citations usually first occur in the domestic order, where people know you and your work first, and only from there could circulate beyond personal acquaintance, eventually leading to multiple citations from a more distant readership. An important empirical question arises, which this article cannot yet satisfactorily deal with, namely: how exactly is the tabooing of the domestic order learned, perpetuated, and stabilized?

We propose that four conventions – megalophilia, neophilia, necrophilia, and allophilia – can be discerned in the social sciences and in the publications of German-speaking anthropologists in particular. These conventions forge compromises between the six orders of worth (“inspiration”, “house”, “civic order”, “fame”, “market”, and “industry”).

Megalophilia as perhaps the most reliable contemporary convention of citation means taking little risk by citing famed, widely known and frequently cited authors – giants. This certainly resonates with the convention of fame, whereby “worth depends solely on the number of persons who award their esteem … worth is independent of self-esteem” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006:100). However, public opinion is capri-
cious and may change at any whim. But people who profit from megalophilia have managed to protect their fame by establishing brands and branding their texts, making use of copyright and intellectual property rights (civic order), and by collaborating with the publishing industry, which is interested in creating giants and branding. When the compromise between these conventions stabilizes, it minimizes free-market competition.

Megalophilia arises from individual assessments of who is the authority on a specific issue and whom they think others will consider as the authority. Citations create authority. This is the critical point in the production of giants. The more famous and distinguished the author, the more credible and weighty the borrowed authority. This convention often lends to a star cult, the veneration of celebrated authors and thereby creates a devoted following of disciples. The mantra of such cultists is never to cite an author who is not established or at least sitting on the shoulder of an established giant; thus, quite plainly German anthropologists cannot be cited without raising doubts on the part of the critical reader. An author citing a German anthropologist is easily suspected of having fallen for a mere epigone, for secondary literature, and for being ignorant of the “true” source. While this can easily happen even within the German discourse, it seems to be the rule within the Anglo-Saxon discourse. By citing celebrated stars of the guild – or sometimes neighbouring guilds, like Foucault or Latour in anthropology – these authors turn into fans, who co-produce contemporary giants. The range of recognition of a celebrity is, of course, related to disciplinary and language boundaries, only few celebrities achieve global fame. This again is partly related to the convention of neophilia.

Neophilia: Love of the new. Neophilia emerges as a convention of citation between three orders of worth: fame, the need for other’s recognition, the market, the desire to outperform competition, and inspiration, a sort of genial grace or artistic intuition which denounces worldly attachments of all sorts. The rise to fame is accelerated by a mazy and promiscuous cultural inspiration, “zapping” from one source to the next without in-depth reading, which results in a situation where puffery may easily be taken for competition between solid new propositions. We propose this type of citation convention for those who prioritize novelty. Practitioners are trend scouts of a sort. They scan the academic landscape for the new and vanguard. Authors are young or young at heart. Their aim is to produce and mark their publications as fashion goods. Being neophil denotes citing authors who are hardly known in a certain domain – by no means mainstream – but then again are known widely enough to deserve the label “cutting edge”; something impossible with a truly new approach. Trend scouts do not vie to produce the most stable and enduring commodities on the publisher’s market. Rather their contributions need to hold together as fashionable for a few years and then may vanish when others pick it up, i.e. developing a new terminology for established issues or positing yet another “turn” (cf. Schimank 2012:12). In our understanding neophilia is currently the leading convention. When a certain author is en vogue for ten years or so, then she definitely is turned into a celebrity with an approximate
life span of thirty years after her first break-through of fame (which is, of course, hard to date).

**Necrophilia:** Love of the dead. Necrophilia emerges in the order of the house: “people’s worth depends on their hierarchical position in a chain of personal dependencies (…) each man is a father to his subordinates and a son to his superiors” (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006:90). But to fabricate a specific and somewhat robust intellectual genealogy for an argument, a compromise is forged between the domestic order and fame. It is about prioritising tradition and the bygone, a celebrated past. Ad fontes! The maxim of necrophilists is never to cite living authors. The longer the author is dead, the more trustworthy and credible he appears and the better suited to bestow authority to an argument. Ideally these traditionalists resort to an ancient Greek giant, alternatively to a German, English or French philosopher between the eighteenth and the early twentieth century. Citations serve to produce a text, which can be identified as a classical good and its authors as guardians of the old school. Sometimes necrophilia can lead to a new fashion when being picked-up by neophilists and used to mark a new turn (like re-discovering Karl Marx).

**Allophilia:** Love of the other, which often implies fear of the own.\(^\text{15}\) This convention seems to define German anthropology, where there is a certain discomfort with deriving authority from authors who are too close to home and a related attachment to the distant Other, preferably English, French, or American authors. Below we relate the German allophilic tradition to historical developments and show why this convention of citation might have become more pronounced in German-speaking anthropology than elsewhere. Nonetheless, it also intersects with other conventions, such as neophilia and megalophilia, and amplifies their effects to the disadvantage of German publications.

**Compromises and Cumulation Effects**

These four conventions of citations – namely necro-, neo-, allo- and megalophilia – have emerged and are put in practice through techniques of citation. Empirically speaking those conventions can hardly be discerned in their pure form, rather authors may combine or alternate between various conventions which already are compromises between different, at times seemingly incommensurable worths (i.e. inspiration and market). Necrophilists and megalophilists, for instance, depend upon branding, a process that their citations enable in the first place. And – importantly – neophilia perhaps somewhat counterintuitively often leads to branding and the formation of identifiable

\(^{15}\) In this we broadly follow Kohl (1997:101) without buying into his full argument, which explains a contemporary pattern of citation by referring the Nazi past as the nightmare in German history that so often is mobilized to explain things.
schools. This entails developing and using a specific identifiable jargon (such as in ANT, postcolonial studies, feminist studies, etc.) and citing an emergent canon so that a publication can be associated unambiguously with a certain source of inspiration, ideally one or a few newly emerging giants (which often situate themselves in a distinguished genealogy with an ancient super giant). When the neophilia of one intellectual arena meets another’s allophilia, we mean, for example, when Anglo-Saxon neophilia meets German anthropology’s allophilia, cumulative effects arise: these two conventions mutually reinforce each other in the production of celebrities. Some few profit from all conventions of citation and are turned into giants, whereas others are dwarfed by the same practices time and again. This mechanism characterizes the citations practices in German anthropology after 1965.

Citations in German-speaking anthropology are a particularly instructive case because the global dominance of English and Anglo-Saxon scholarship intersect with German allophilia: No home-grown giants are produced (excluding the Pierre Kernowicz type), while simultaneously the creation of international super giants is supported. Due to the wide dissemination of Anglo-Saxon scholarship, which also affects countries with less problematic histories, we suggest that the allophilia in German-speaking anthropology has in recent decades become mainly an Anglophilia.

In German sociology, in contrast, there is a strong tendency towards branding and the formation of schools, drawing on the market, fame and domestic orders. The formation of schools stabilizes hierarchical structures in academia but at the same time facilitates effective communication, bundles attentions and therewith increases the chances of younger or less known scholars to rise to fame by associating with a school and a related canon (Schimank 2012). Again, a giant of the sociology of science, Robert K. Merton, is known for drawing attention to asymmetries of power and repute in the publication and dissemination of scholarly work. He showed that famous scientists receive disproportionately more credit and recognition for the same effort than younger or nameless colleagues. Merton (1968:2) subsumes:

This complex pattern of the misallocation of credit for scientific work must quite evidently be described as “the Matthew effect,” for, as will be remembered, the Gospel According to St. Matthew puts it this way: For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.

Suchlike asymmetries between established and not established scholars support a general tendency towards the fabrication of giants.

**Contextualising conventions of citation in post-1960s Germany**

The absence of giants in German-speaking anthropology, according to Oberdiek (2013:9), relates to a dearth of theoretical innovations. These, he argues, cannot
emerge due to a deeply ingrained culture of obedience (Oberdiek 2013:11–14). Accordingly, obedience chokes all creativity in German anthropological institutions, but he does not link submissiveness to actual practices of citation, which interest us. He holds that German anthropologists are bound by structures that instil obedience and yes-saying. While this observation would entail the emergence of giants and schools, where subordinates have to obey and cite their own superiors and elders, this strangely is not the case. As Oberdiek himself notices (2013:74, 75), German anthropologists are rather drawn to more distant sources of inspiration. Because of this inconsistency in Oberdiek’s interpretation and because of its baffling culturalist essentialism, we think that this circumstance is connected to the convention of citation we called allophilia: the exaggerated love of all foreign things and the implicated fearful rejection of the own. We trace the historical emergence of allophilia in German-speaking anthropology to the mid 1960s through the case of Wilhelm E. Mühlmann and his students.

Kohl (1997) explains the extreme expression of allophilia in the discipline after 1965 with the enmeshment of German anthropology with the Nazi regime. Against Fischer’s (1990) thesis that German anthropologists managed to more or less muddle through this dark phase of German history, being hardly noticed in their niche, other studies demonstrated how substantial parts of anthropology had put themselves at the service of the Nazi racist and social darwinist ideologies, lending to and/or enforcing the horrifying Aryanization project (Streck 2000a: 8; Gingrich 2005:114). When the real extent of the Nazi crimes gradually became known and was established in the Eichmann and Auschwitz trials in the 1960s, this also marked a rupture in German anthropology (Kohl 1997:106). The former generation of collaborators or even propagators of NS ideologies, which had contributed to the heinous crimes of the Nazis, had largely survived the change of system in their old institutions; some even were promoted after the war. In the later 1960s, this disciplinary continuity was problematized. While this applies to the Federal Republic of Germany, strategists of the German Democratic Republic developed a different plan for anthropology. It allowed only one department, namely at the University of Leipzig, and offered the chair to Julius Lips, who had fled from Nazi persecution to New York.

In the mid 1960s a generational conflict became manifest in German-speaking anthropology in Germany, Switzerland, and Austria: Whereas the teachers had turned to rigid empiricism, suspicious of grand theory and political entanglements, drawing their lessons from the Nazi era, a younger generation of anthropologists emerged

16 Gingrich (2005:128) differentiates between three types of responsibility in German anthropology for NS crimes: “First, some anthropologists made successful personal contributions toward the professional destruction or physical elimination of other persons, by denouncing them, by recommending that they lose their jobs, and so forth. Second, some anthropologists carried out applied research for Nazi purposes. In cases of responsibility in the narrow sense would benefit [sic] from the Nazi killing machine or contribute to it. Third, some anthropologists produced explicit propaganda for the Nazi regime and elaborated its ideology by using and abusing their academic and professional authority.”
which was highly political and theoretically interested, re-reading Marx and critical theory (Kramer and Rees 2005:120; Haller 2012:188, 189, 204, 205). Disgusted by the Nazi involvements and the continuity of staff at anthropological institutes, the younger generation of anthropologists expressed their contempt of the German tradition, turning away from the intellectually mired generation of teachers (homophobia) and seeking out English and French anthropological traditions for inspiration (allophilia) (Kramer 1995:85; Kohl 1997:102; Gingrich 2005:136). Everything “German” had to be shunned.

Fritz Kramer, a student of Mühlmann, and the first teacher of Richard Rottenburg, indicates how he struggled with his teacher’s Nazi entanglements:

Wilhelm Emil Mühlmann, (…) as student of Edmund Husserl and Richard Thurnwald, was perhaps the only anthropologist with a social scientific orientation and a philosophically reflected basis. He was isolated in German anthropology, but that actually made him more appealing for young people. But then we students had to read that in 1944 he had endorsed the “Endlösung der Judenfrage” [lit. “The final solution of the Jewish question”, that is, the systematic annihilation of Jewish people]. Even today, I can still remember the shock of this sinister discovery. The sense of trust one has to have in a teacher had suddenly disappeared. We were helpless, without orientation. In this situation, it was an almost arbitrary decision to immerse ourselves in British Social Anthropology, no matter what, to then see what we could make of it (Kramer and Rees 2005:121, our translation).

Mühlmann (1904–1988) is an ambiguous figure in German anthropology: As Kramer already noted, he was one of the most outstanding, theoretically versed and innovative scholars, who had a lasting impact on the discipline. At the same time, Mühlmann was opportunistic and became one of the most influential anthropologists of the Nazi era, endorsing a stronger integration of physical anthropology and its racial “cleansing” enterprise (Michel 1995:142–146; Hauschild 1995:7–9; Geisenhainer 2000:84, 85; Streck 2000a:9; Gingrich 2005:132–134). In view of this generational rift, we shortly sketch citation practices in the relationship between Mühlmann and two of his students, namely Christian Sigrist and Fritz Kramer.17

Christian Sigrist offers an interesting reflection on the ruptures in citation practices in post-war German anthropology. In his book Regulierte Anarchie, published in 1967 (based on his dissertation from 1965), before the main student revolts, Sigrists thanked several professors; Mühlmann was one of them. Sigrist contributed to debates about

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17 See also the case of Michael Oppitz who turned to French structuralism (Oppitz 1975, 1989, 1991). He amply cites the work of Anglo-American(-ized) scholars, such as Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard, also Turner, Boas and Leach. He further cites a few contemporary German contributions and few earlier German references, that is, before the NS-period, such as Ehrenreich and Cassirer. But his main influence was Lévi-Strauss.
political domination and the emergence of order in acephalous societies. Streck refers to this work as “a milestone of ethnosophiology” (2000b: 48), placing Sigrist clearly in one intellectual trajectory with Mühlmann and Thurnwald. Sigrist discussed the contributions of British Social Anthropology, yet interwove them with the work of German-speaking scholars who were susceptible to the national-socialist ideologies, such as Mühlmann and Thurnwald. In the mid 1960s this evidently was still appropriate following the then perhaps still prevalent domestic convention. Altogether Sigrist cites eleven of Mühlmann’s publications and also seven of Mühlmann’s teacher Richard Thurnwald. He also refers to Carl Schmitt, a legal scholar, who in legal studies played a role similar to Mühlmann in anthropology and Martin Heidegger in philosophy. For our little excursus into the historic moment of the mid-late 1960s it is important to note that the anthropologist Mühlmann (1904–1988) simply had to leave the stage, while Schmitt (1888–1985) and Heidegger (1889–1976) would continue to perform and manage to achieve lasting international repute. We suggest that the attempt to explain this discrepancy with reference to the difference between the originality and intellectual weight of these three authors is not convincing. Instead we assume that the difference is related to the particular mode in which German anthropology was remade after the 1960s. While allophilia might also prevail in German philosophy, law, sociology, and political science (and certainly other disciplines in other countries also have their allo- or shall we say “Anglo”-philias), it seems that only in anthropology it continues to dominate the other conventions and has become part of a permanent impairment.

The generational rift in German anthropology becomes apparent when we look at practices of citation in the 1970s and observe a shift away from the domestic convention towards allophilia. In *Verkehrte Welten*, Kramer (1981 [1977]) discusses the intellectual roots of German anthropology. He engages with the work of Creuzer, Herder, Hegel, Bachofen and Bastian at length, but also Gaugin and Nolde. He merely cites his teacher’s *Homo Creator* (Mühlmann 1962) in a footnote to support his own qualification of Jensen’s romantic mythology (Kramer 1981 [1977]: 126, en 35). In another footnote (1981 [1977]: 130, en13) a second brief citation refers en passant to Mühlmann’s essay “Das Mythologem von der verkehrten Welt” (1964). In *Der rote Fez*, Kramer (1987) mentions his former teacher in passing-by only to refute his views of possession and claims about females and their propensity to magic (Mühlmann 1972:69 and 1981:28f in Kramer 1987:58, 157). In the important volumes *Gesellschaften ohne Staat* (1978a and b), which introduce German audiences to founding texts in British Social Anthropology, Fritz Kramer and Christian Sigrist engage thoroughly with Evans-Pritchard, Fortes, Firth, Malinowski, Gluckman, Leach and so forth with no mention of Mühlmann – what indeed was the intention for consulting British Social Anthropology in the first place. It is remarkable though, that the British authors chosen for translation into German in 1978 were all established celebrities, who in Britain had passed the zenith of their fame since at least ten years, making place for newly emerging celebrities. While Mühlmann had to resign from his chair in Heidelberg in
1969, in the UK the old celebrities of colonial British anthropology also lost their authority roughly during the same time period – although for different reasons.

Allophilia, privileging citations from distant authors and schools, prevails down to our day, though the attention shifted towards authors, who are labelled as “cutting-edge” within Anglo-Saxon and French debates. According to Kohl and Haller the narrated history explains why German-speaking anthropologists hardly take note of and cite each others’ work, but tend to be oriented towards Anglophone or Francophone anthropology (Haller 2012:21). We do not want to argue that the narrated history is completely irrelevant when trying to make sense of contemporary practices of citation. However, in view of our approach that focuses on conventions, it makes little sense to assume that a convention has one single historical origin. We rather tried to show above that citation practices are primarily guided by conventions that recognize “originality” which again is dependent on heterogeneous orders of worth that have different, partly contradictory consequences on what counts as original and what is of worth. In German anthropology shortly after 1965 citing the “own” easily raises the suspicion that one is lacking the necessary autonomy and critical distance to one’s own stable. This has become a well-established convention that endures, yet this endurance cannot be reduced to the rupture of 1945 nor to the critical moment of 1965. That the Anglo-Saxon tradition is so highly esteemed – in Oberdiek’s terms as truly innovative and generating theories – is yet another but similarly arresting point because the formulation of theories is otherwise often associated rather with French and German intellectual traditions, whereas the Anglo-Saxon style is famed more for its empiricism and its rich descriptions, while it mostly shies back from grand theory (Galtung 1981). In anthropology after 1965 this old “national” division of labour does not hold any longer – at least at first sight. A closer look at American anthropology since the early 1980s reveals that a substantial part of its innovative power is grounded in its eagerness and high capacity to learn (for instance Paul Rabinow) from grand French social theory and philosophy or even from German traditions (like for instance Clifford Geertz; see Oberdiek 2013). Thus when German allophil anthropology imports from American anthropology, it often re-imports good old European or sometimes even German stuff. On a different level, one can thus say that Anglo-Saxon anthropology has its own allophilia, which does not love other anthropologies, but other theories.

Getting no Credit on the Global Market – Fritz Kramer

An important intellectual movement in anthropology was launched with the Writing Culture debate. Oberdiek (2013:80) notes that no German anthropologist contributed originally to this debate but that several attempted to hop on the bandwagon. This observation is important for our argument. We contend that in view of the prevailing conventions and techniques of citation such a contribution, even if made early on,
could not be recognized and this does not pertain only to German contributions (although our example is drawn from German anthropology). In the following we give an example of innovative work, which actually forestalled the Writing Culture debate, but did not manage to achieve international repute, and as Oberdiek’s case illustrates, is not even well-known among German anthropologists.

Let us return to Fritz Kramer’s *Verkehrte Welten*, published in 1977. This is an important but largely unrecognized book. Literally meaning “reversed worlds,” Kramer showed how ethnography of the nineteenth century portrayed the foreign as the reverse world of the own culture, its values and unquestioned suppositions. Projecting the counterpoint and the prohibited in the own culture onto “savage” cultures, lead to an ethnocentric denigration and othering, a sort of “imaginary ethnography.” A similar point was made one year later by Edward Said in *Orientalism* (1994 [1978]). A polemic book, which was widely received and which claims that orientalist scholarship stereotyped the East in ways that served the economic and political interests of the West. Said’s book is widely seen as the starting point for various burgeoning critical literatures, such as subaltern and postcolonial studies, and is said to have ushered forth the so-called “crisis of representation” in anthropology. Talking about this in anthropology now demands citing Said (1994 [1978]) as well as James Clifford and George Marcus’s edited volume *Writing Culture* (1986), who are held with introducing this debate to anthropology – nearly ten years after Kramer’s work.

A caveat: We do not suggest that whoever published an idea first actually originated it. Together with the authors quoted above (Merton, Latour, Boltanski, Thévenot) we take it for granted that ideas neither emerge ex nihilo nor arise in a single head but would hold that ideas can only be generated in the interstitial space between different heads. That is to say, the idea of imaginary ethnography/orientalism emerged from a dialogue between several scholars and the cumulations of their work in an era when these ideas were ripe, so to speak. We hence problematize attributing the merits to a single author only.18

Kramer’s second book has a similar trajectory, although it was actually translated into English six years after its appearance on the German reader’s market. In *Der rote Fes* (1987, English 1993), Kramer discusses how African art and rituals represent the cultural other – savages and aliens – and mimic them in various ways, i.e. through possession cults, dance, healing rituals, plastic art, myths, etc. Kramer argues that it is always forces outside of the own order, which frighten and possess people: “People in these cults are never possessed by a thing to which they themselves belong; being pos-

18 While Kramer’s first book was never translated into English, he did publish a summary of his argument in *Dialectical Anthropology* in 1985. But according to the Citation Indexes on “Web of Science”, which we accessed in January 2014, this contribution was nearly ignored by Anglo-Saxon anthropology. On searching for “imaginary ethnography”, Web of Science produces two further items referring to Kramer, one book review in a German and another one in a French journal (Lange 1979; Rath 1980).
essed by something means that one has no practical dealings with it” (1993:100). Possession, according to Kramer, by allowing the mimetic replication and internalization of foreignness is the means to interpret and deal with differences between self and the cultural other.

However, some reviewers found nothing original in the book. See, for example, this review by Richard Werbner:

On the back cover Johannes Fabian writes, ‘at last this great book is available in English’. However, if in German The Red Fesz really is a great book, in English, it is not – and in no way is this a disparaging comment upon Malcolm Green’s highly readable, often pungent translation. Instead, the point is that Kramer’s meisterstuck is a remarkable accomplishment in the translation into both German and a German ethnological tradition of gestalt comparison from, in the main, English ethnographic sources and, above all, outstanding contributions in the British social anthropology of the 1960’s and 1970’s. Now read in backwards translation, so to speak, The Red Fesz, evokes a sense of deja vu” (Werbner 1995:339, 340).

The claim is that this is a case of cryptomnesia. It can only seem innovative in the limited and marginal field of German-speaking anthropology. Yet, we maintain that Kramer did in fact make a significant contribution by calling for a rethinking of mimesis (and we think this is a similar case to Singh’s overlooked contribution to physics mentioned in the introduction). Still, our point is that this should not be about attributing the credits to the one or the other author exclusively, but rather that – and here we repeat ourselves for emphasis – it is always several people who contribute to giving a new idea a textual form and one of the major contributions to the theory of mimesis after Auerbach, Adorno and Benjamin was Kramer.

Nevertheless, not all reviewers shared Werbner’s view. Michael Lambek (1994:722) praised the book as “a consistently intelligent interpretation of spirit possession.” Janice Boddy (1994) notes in her review that “despite [some] cautions, Kramer’s argument is rich, dense with epistemological implications and suggestive of the role that emotion and imagination play in human understanding. Its breadth and virtuosity together mount an important challenge to existing paradigms of cultural difference.” Importantly, in addition to some serious critiques, she also commended its timely revival and extension of a theory of mimesis. However, this did not seem to have resonated very far. It rather took an Anglophone scholar to write about this topic in the same year to count as a contribution. Michael Taussig’s Mimesis and Alterity (1993), which examines practices of constructing the self and mimicking the cultural other mainly in South America, is credited with being “extraordinarily innovative” in anthropology in a main US-anthropology journal (Bibeau 1995:627). But this is precisely one of the points Kramer made in Der rote Fes from 1987 – namely that in mimesis one conforms with something one is not and also should not be. But in his case this was not classified as extraordinarily innovative.
Importantly, we again do not assert that Kramer’s work is the true original source, nor that Kramer’s contribution is superior to Taussig’s. Yet, we believe that this is one of the many cases where we do have an earlier non-English text that makes a remarkable contribution, but a later Anglo-Saxon text gets all the credit. Our point thus is that established conventions and techniques of citation work towards the production of giants and render some scholarly work invisible, while accentuating other scholars’ contributions. The German convention of allophilia amplifies this effect. Clearly, Taussig was turned into a giant, while Kramer in spite of comparable contributions remained a dwarf.\footnote{Ironically, Kramer not only contributed to the development of a theory of mimesis but also penned his dissertation on literature among the Cuna Indians of Panama and Columbia (Kramer 1970), people who are central to Taussig’s analysis of mimesis, and again he is not aware of Kramer’s publication but only draws on Norman M. Chapin’s unpublished Ph.D. thesis of 1983 “Curing among the San Blas Kuna of Panama”.
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**Outlook**

Whom we cite and whom we ignore has consequences. Citations are a good indicator of which work is un/recognized. They reward authors by attributing originality and may increase or diminish the truth value of published ideas. Cited works are often constructed as “true sources” of innovation and scientific development. In this paper we drew out four ideal-typical conventions of citations, which in various combinations are put in practice through a wider range of citation techniques, which we delineated. We hold that a recognisable feature of German-speaking anthropology is its citation convention named allophilia. German allophilia reinforces contemporary global structuring principles of knowledge production connected to the order of worths of the market and of fame, mainly the mechanisms encouraging branding. Branding, at the same time, makes neophilia the most important citation convention, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon academic world. Since neophilia, the citing of English-speaking cutting edge authors, serves allophilic German desires, the two amplify each other. Becoming a brand name is the ultimate goal of a market-oriented knowledge production and neophilia is the citation convention that helps to achieve this goal.

While we offer some provisional reflections on citation practices in German anthropology, some questions remain and merit further comparative examination: for instance, why did German sociology develop so differently from anthropology? Or why is the situation of French sociology, anthropology and philosophy so different? A further interesting question would be, why allophilic tendencies did not emerge in European Anthropology (Folklore Studies) in Germany until about 1990?
We like to end, though, on a more thoughtful note concerning what may transform conventions of citations in the same direction as branding and already is beginning to do so. Before the younger author (Calkins) had completed her dissertation, she was chatting with fellow Ph. D. students about their work. Someone suggested the necessity of doing a plagiarism self-test. Just to be on the safe side. A colleague mentioned he had done this for his thesis and was surprised the software marked some passages red, which he knew he had written himself but which he then chose to reformulate. Curious and concerned about recent plagiarism charges in German academia, Calkins looked into different types of software offers and opted for a rather cheap online plagiarism test.

To give one example of how such new anti-plagiarism software can change citation practices: In the dissertation about how Rashaida in Sudan process uncertainties in existential situations, the software marked a short passage of two or three sentences red which was reviewing literature on experience and uncertainty, indicating that it might have been plagiarized. It offered several references, but most prominently the book *Social Suffering*, edited by Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das and Margret Lock (2003). While Calkins was broadly aware of the book, she hadn’t read it and hence could not have plagiarized it. The important point is that this potential plagiarism actually motivated her to go to the library, get the book and cite it at the appropriate place shortly before submitting the thesis. These new technologies suggest potential sources to the user and encourage the spread of perfunctory citations. They thereby allow monitoring and controlling who is cited in a text and crucially who is missing. Certain ideas – or shall we say combinations of words, such as experience, uncertainty and suffering – call for certain authors (namely Kleinman, Das and Lock 2003), they become obligatory. To check for plagiarism, this software works with algorithms and programmes, which are not known to the user. Black-boxed and mysterious, these technologies coupled with the threat of plagiarism charges can coerce individuals to cite certain dominant authors ahead of others – in this case again established scholars in (mainly) Anglophone anthropology. They may have far-reaching consequences upon the organization of the social sciences. The working of these technologies, their standards and normativities deserve further research.

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